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2012 HIGGINS DISTINGUISHED VISITOR
LECTURE

THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT CLASS ACTION
JURISPRUDENCE: GAZING INTO A CRYSTAL BALL
by

Mary Kay Kane*
In this Article, Professor Kane analyzes the six class-action cases most
recently in the Supreme Court, starting with the Court's opinion in Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. at the

end of the 2009-10 Term through the five cases in the 2010-11 Term to
determine if there is any common theme underlying the decisions, as well as
what their impact may be. She draws two conclusions. First, the cluster of
class-action cases decided by the Court is particularly significant largely
because it covers many different and important issues central to the field
rather than because the Court embarked on new, uncharted paths. Second,
although the availability of class arbitrationhas been severely restricted, if
not effectively eliminated for state consumer claims, the Court has not
sounded the death knellforfuture class litigationand Rule 23 may continue
to serve as a viable procedural remedy for resolving aggregatedisputes. This
is seen by examining how the lower courts are interpreting these opinions
and are continuing to certify class actions under the Court's newlyarticulatedstandards.
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I. INTRODUCTION

It is not a surprising or particularly insightful observation to note
when the United States Supreme Court decides to grant certiorari to a
number of cases in the same field within a short period of time, that the
Court may be seeking to deliver some important message that may
change substantially the way in which litigation in a given area is able to
proceed in the future.' In the field of civil procedure, for example,
consider the trilogy of summary-judgment cases in the mid-1980s2 that
clarified the parties' burdens on those motions and effectively increased
the possibility of successful summary-judgment motions. Or even more
recently, consider the Court's pleading decisions that changed the
standard for determining whether a claim for relief has been stated to
one looking at whether sufficient facts are pleaded to show a claim "that
is plausible on its face," not merely conceivable.
In the class-action arena, the Court similarly has periodically entered
the fray to respond to lower court efforts to manage and deal with this
modem form of complex litigation and the enthusiastic reception it first
received after the 1966 amendments to Rule 23.' Thus, during the 1970s
the Court limited the availability of diversity class actions when it issued
its famous jurisdiction decisions holding that class members could not
aggregate their individual claims to meet the required jurisdictional
amount in controversy. The Court also tackled the notice requirements
for Rule 23(b) (3) common-question suits, requiring plaintiffs to absorb
all costs for delivering individualized notice to class members who are
identifiable through a reasonable effort,6 and rejecting the lower courts'

' Consider, for example, that in May-June of 1989, five decisions on Title VII
were handed down by a sharply divided Supreme Court. As noted by one
commentator, "This is a remarkably large number of Supreme Court decisions to be
issued interpreting a single title of a single statute in less than two months, and it
signaled a clear move by the Court to turn back the rising tide of private Title VII
lawsuits." SFAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIc REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAwsurrs

INTHE U.S. 180 (2010). And it was those decisions that led to the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
2 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Bell AL. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
See generally 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1754 (3d ed. 2005).
5 Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.
332, 336-38 (1969).
6 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358-59 (1978) (holding that
the plaintiff must bear the cost of compiling the class member list so that notice can
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attempts to develop approaches to allow the opportunity for
interlocutory appeals of decisions either to grant or deny class
certification. And at the end of the 1990s, it dealt with the problems
posed by class settlements of present and future claims in the nationwide
asbestos litigation, finding that class treatment could not be allowed
consistent with due-process concerns for the absent class members.
Of course, there were additional individual Supreme Court decisions
from time to time that dealt with discrete class-action issues.9 But, for
purposes of this Article, the point is that often when the Court has
determined to make more than one major pronouncement in a field
during the course of one or two terms, it can be seen as attempting to
correct a direction in which the lower courts appear to be heading or
seeking to establish a new "order" or theoretical framework to govern the
field.
Thus, noting the Court's seminal opinion involving governing law in
federal diversity class actions, issued in March of the 2009-2010 Term, 0
and that five class-action certiorari petitions were pending in the 20102011 Term, it seemed at the start of last year's term that we might again
witness another major movement in class-action procedural law. Indeed,
since most of the prior class-action procedural shifts just mentioned
entailed only two or three cases, and the current Court in the span of two
terms would have the potential of ruling on six cases, a seismic event
might be on the horizon. Consequently, when Dean Klonoff extended to
me the invitation to serve as the Distinguished Higgins Visitor in March

be sent to them); Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974) (holding that
individual notice must be provided to Rule 23(b) (3) class members who are
identifiable through a reasonable effort).
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468-69, 476 (1978) (holding that
denial of class certification is not appealable under the "collateral order" doctrine or
the "death knell" theory); Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 478, 478-79
(1978) (affirming that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) cannot be used to allow an immediate
appeal of an order refusing class certification). The impact of these decisions
restricting early review of class certification orders was eliminated with the adoption
in 1998 of Rule 23(f), authorizing a discretionary interlocutory appeals system for
class certification decisions. See 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 4, at § 1802.2.
' Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997). In both these cases, which involved settlements,
the Court found that class certification was improper, as the interests of the absent
class members were not adequately represented, and in the instance of future
claimants, could not be so. Certification in Ortiz also was held improper as a
mandatory, limited-fund class action under Rule 23(b) (1) (B). Taken together, these
cases raised serious questions whether any global resolution of present and future
claims in mass toxic-tort cases would be possible by adequately structuring the
representation and notice features to respond to the Court's concerns.
" See, e.g., Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002) (holding that class objectors
can appeal a judgment upholding a class settlement without formally intervening);
Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (applying personal jurisdiction, due
process and preclusion to state class-action judgments).
10 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).

1018

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:3

2012, well after the Supreme Court would have acted on all those cases, I
thought this might provide an opportunity to reflect on what new paths
the Court may have illuminated or new frameworks it may have imposed.
Of course, this topic had its own risks since I agreed to explore it having
no idea what the Court was going to do. The evidence is now in, and I
would like to share what I learned from the Supreme Court's most recent
class-action jurisprudence.
I will begin by describing, in the order in which they emerged, what
class-action question each of the cases involved and then turn to looking
at their results and the Court's analysis to see whether there is any
common theme linking them together. I then will look at how the lower
courts appear to be responding to the Court's decisions and offer some
reflections on what the significance of this line of Supreme Court cases
might be.

II. THE CASES BEFORE THE COURT
The first case to be considered is Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates,
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co." The case, among other things, involved class
claims that the defendant insurer had violated New York law in failing to
pay statutory interest penalties on overdue payments of insurance
benefits owed under no-fault automobile insurance policies. The
question posed was whether Rule 23 should govern over a New York
statute that prohibited class actions in suits seeking penalties or statutory
12
minimum damages.
The Court rendered a 5-4 decision, with Justice Scalia writing for the
majority,13 Justice Ginsburg writing for the dissent, 4 and Justice Stevens
filing a concurrence in part. The majority held that Federal Rule 23 was
in conflict with New York state law. As Justice Scalia reasoned, the federal
rule authorizes any class action that meets its requirements, Rule 23 is a
valid rule under the Rules Enabling Act, and thus Rule 23 controlled,
allowing the class action to proceed. Standing alone, there is no
question but that Shady Grove's primary significance is not because it is a
class action, but because Justice Scalia's analysis changed substantially the
approach taken in previous governing law decisions of seeking to avoid
finding a conflict between a federal rule and state law and thus allowing
both to co-exist. 7 However, for class-action implications, the majority's

" Id.
12 Id. at
1436.
" The other justices in the majority were Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Stevens, Thomas, and Sotomayor. Id. at 1435.
The other dissenters were Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. Id. at 1460.
Id. at 1437-38, 1442-43; see also Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
'6 See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
17 As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, "[bly finding a conflict without
considering whether Rule 23 rationally should be read to avoid any collision, the
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interpretation of Rule 23 as offering an absolute right to class
certification for any action meeting its requirements makes the case
important to consider in light of the Court's treatment of district court
discretion in applping and interpreting class-action requirements in the
2010-2011 Term.
The second case to be considered is AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion,2 0 another 5-4 decision, rendered on April 27, 2011. The case
was brought by a California telephone customer alleging that the
company's offer of a free phone to anyone who signed up for its
cellphone service was fraudulent because customers were charged sales
tax on the retail value of the phones. The company moved under its
contract with the customer to compel arbitration. Standard provisions in
its cellphone contracts prohibited classwide arbitrations. The question
posed was whether California's judicial rule regarding the
unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts
involving small amounts controlled. If so, the state could condition the
enforceability of those agreements on the availability of classwide
arbitration procedures and thereby, effectively, reuire that classwide
arbitration be available for small consumer contracts.
Justice Scalia again wrote for the majority,22 Justice Thomas filed a
concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer wrote for the dissent." The
majority held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California's rule
regarding the unenforceability of such arbitration agreements.
Additionally, it found that classwide arbitration interferes with the
fundamental attributes of arbitration and greatly increases risks to
defendants because the absence of multilayered review in arbitration
makes it more likely that errors will go uncorrected. That risk of error
was deemed unacceptable when damages allegedly owed to thousands of
24
claimants are aggregated and decided at once. The dissent, not
Court unwisely and unnecessarily retreats from the federalism principles undergirding
Erie." Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1468.
" After highlighting the Rule 23 requirements, Justice Scalia concluded: "By its
terms this creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified
criteria to pursue his claim as a class action.... Rule 23 provides a one-size-fits-all
formula for deciding the class-action question." Id. at 1437.
* See the discussion at notes 43-65 infra.
2
2

131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
Id. at 1744-46.

The other members in the majority were Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Id. at 1743.
23 The other dissenters were Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. Id. at 1756.
Id. at 1748-53. In fact, the distinctions between bilateral and class arbitration
2
highlighted by Justice Scalia reflected similar views seen in an opinion from the
previous year, Stolt-Niesen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010), in
which a divided Court (five majority justices led by Justice Alito, and three dissenters,
led by Justice Ginsburg, with Justice Sotomayor not taking part in the decision) held
that when an arbitration contract is silent on the question whether class arbitration is
allowed, it is contrary to the Federal Arbitration Act for the arbitrators to interpret
22
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surprisingly, found no inconsistency between California's rule and the
federal act's language and purpose and further noted that while the
majority highlighted perceived disadvantages of class arbitrations, "class
proceedings have countervailing advantages. In general agreements that
forbid the consolidation of claims can lead small-dollar claimants to
abandon their claims rather than to litigate.",1 Thus the dissent
concluded:
In California's perfectly rational view, non-class arbitration over
such sums will also sometimes have the effect of depriving claimants
of their claims (say, for example, where claiming the $30.22 were to
involve filling out many forms that require technical legal
knowledge or waiting at great length while a call is placed on
hold).... Why is this kind of decision-weighing the pros and cons
of all class proceedings alike-not California's to make?2
But, according to the majority, " [s] tates cannot require a procedure that
is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated
reasons."
The third case, decided by the Court on June 6, 2011, is Erica P. John
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.28 The case was a putative securities-fraud class
action in which the plaintiffs sought to satisfy the reliance element of
their fraud claim by utilizing a rebuttable presumption that reliance
existed because the conduct involved a "fraud on the market" as a whole.
The issue before the Court was whether, in order to trigger the
rebuttable presumption for reliance so as to obtain class certification, it
was necessary for the plaintiffs first to prove "loss causation"-that is, that
defendant's deceptive conduct caused the stock prices to fall resulting in
the investors' claimed economic loss." ChiefJustice Roberts, writing for a
unanimous Court, sided with the plaintiffs and ruled that the losscausation issue is not a barrier to finding that the Rule 23(b) (3)
predominance requirement is met. The Court found that to hold
otherwise would have been inconsistent with its 1988 decision in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson,so which upheld the ability of plaintiffs to invoke the
rebuttable presumption for reliance if they based their claims on a fraud31
on-the-market theory. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts noted that in the
Basic decision the Court recognized that requiring individualized proof
of reliance would effectively prevent plaintiffs from proceeding on a class
basis because individual issues then necessarily would predominate and

the contract as imposing class arbitration because the changes necessitated by moving
from bilateral to class arbitration were too fundamental. Id. at 1775.
25 AT&TMobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1760 (BreyerJ.,
dissenting).
2

Id. at 1761.

2

Id. at 1753 (majority opinion).

2

131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).

2

Id. at 2183-85.

3

485 U.S. 224 (1988).

" Id. at 250.
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that would be an improper burden on investors who traded in an
impersonal market.3 2 Thus, to add an additional hurdle, such as the need
to prove loss causation at the class-certification stage, particularly when
that issue is not logically related to the fraud-on-the-market theory, would
be in error.
The fourth case to be considered is Smith v. Bayer Corp.,3 ' decided on
June 16, 2011. The case involved two putative consumer damages class
actions against the same manufacturer, one in federal court and one in
West Virginia state court. The cases alleged similar state-law claims and
the named plaintiffs in the state-court action were unnamed class
members in the federal action. The federal district court reached the
certification question first and denied certification finding that individual
issues predominated over the common questions so that certification
31
under Rule 23(b) (3) was not proper. It then went on to enjoin the
pending state action in order to prevent the relitigation of its denial of
class certification. In a unanimous decision, written by Justice Kagan,
the Court held that the injunction was improper. Even though West
Virginia had a class action rule nearly identical to the federal rule, it
interpreted the predominance requirement differently so that the issues
in the two actions were not identical. This meant that issue preclusion
could not apply and the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act3 could not apply either.3 Further, Justice Kagan ruled that an
unnamed class member cannot be considered a "party" to the action
before the class is certified and thus cannot be bound by rulings
therein.40 The Court did acknowledge that class actions pose special
problems of relitigation, but concluded that those cannot be addressed
by altering preclusion rules or by construing the Anti-Injunction Act

1

Erica P John Fund, 131 S. Ct. at 2185.

" "The fact that a subsequent loss may have been caused by factors other than
the revelation of a misrepresentation has nothing to do with whether an investor
relied on the misrepresentation in the first place, either directly or presumptively
through the fraud-on-the-market theory. Loss causation has no logical connection to
the facts necessary to establish the efficient market predicate to the fraud-on-themarket theory." Id. at 2186.
'

131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).

* Id. at 2374. See generally 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 4, at

§ 1778

(discussing Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirement that "common questions of law or fact must
predominate over .. . individual issues").
3
Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2373.
37 Justice Thomas joined in the first two parts of the Court's opinion, but refused
to join in the last part dealing with whether unnamed class members in actions that
ultimately are not certified are "parties" to the action. Id. at 2373 n.*; see infra note 40
and accompanying text. Justice Thomas did not issue a separate opinion, however.
m 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
3
Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2377-79.
4o "Neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties.
What does have this effect is a class action approved under Rule 23." Id. at 2380.
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exceptions broadly.' Rather, congressional action and notions of comity
would have to suffice to address the problem.
The fifth class-action case in the Court's 2010-2011 Term is the 900pound gorilla in the room, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, decided on

June 20, 2011. This case was undoubtedly the one most watched by classaction advocates and opponents because the context and the issues
involved offered the opportunity for a ruling that would significantly
change the way in which courts apply Rule 23. The case was a Title VII
employment-discrimination action brought on behalf of a nationwide
class of some 1.5 million former and current female employees, who
alleged sex discrimination in both promotion and pay throughout the
national retail-store chain. The core of their case was that the store vested
discretion in the local supervisors over these decisions, and that
discretion was exercised disproportionately in favor of men and had a
disparate impact on female employees, resulting in discrimination. In
this way, plaintiffs sought to bring this case within an earlier Supreme
Court pronouncement that commonality under Rule 23(a) (2) in
employment-discrimination class actions might be satisfied if the
employer had an entirely subjective decisionmaking process. 4 To buttress
their claim that they could prove discrimination by common evidence,
they presented statistical evidence revealing pay and promotion
disparities between men and women; anecdotal reports of discrimination
from about 120 female employees; and testimony by a sociologist
presenting a "social framework analysis" indicating that the workplace
culture fostered sex discrimination throughout the company in violation
of Title VII. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to end the practices, as well
as back pay for those lost opportunities. The question presented was

" Id. at 2381-82.
1 Justice Kagan opined that Congress had attempted to help the problem by
allowing many more state class actions to be removed and consolidated in the federal
courts under the Class Action Fairness Act. Id. at 2382; see also Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, sec. 5, § 1453, 119 Stat. 4, 12 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1453 (2006)). And once cases are removed, she noted, "we would expect federal
courts to apply principles of comity to each other's class certification decisions when
addressing a common dispute." Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2382.
e 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
In GeneralTelephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982), the Court
held that a Mexican-American plaintiff alleging discriminatory treatment in
promotions could not bring a class action on behalf of Mexican-American applicants
for employment because he did not present a claim typical of the class and there was
no common question between his claim and all the other class members. The Court
found that it was not sufficient to merely allege that defendant's entire employment
practices were discriminatory to meet Rule 23's requirements. Id. at 149, 157-59. However,
the Court noted in a footnote that an across-the-board class could be certified if there
was "[s]ignificant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of
discrimination," and if "the discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion
practices in the same general fashion, such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking
processes." Id. at 159 n.15.
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whether the case could be certified, as it was by the court below, under
the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) (2) .
Turning first to whether the action could be brought under Rule
23(b) (2), it is important to understand why utilizing that subdivision,
which applies to actions seeking injunctive relief, was deemed particularly
important. Critically, that provision does not require a finding that
common questions predominate over individual issues, as would be
required if the action were to be certified as a damages action under Rule
Suits certified under subdivision (b) (2) also avoid the
23(b) (3).
expense and necessity of providing individualized notice to all class
members who can be identified with a reasonable effort and of providing
class members with the opportunity to opt out of the class.4 ' Given the
large, dispersed nature of the class in the Wal-Mart case, the
predominance requirement could be difficult to meet and thus
certification was more readily accomplished if Rule 23(b) (2) applied.
Lower courts had been grappling with the issue of how to certify
actions seeking both injunctive and monetary relief (commonly referred
to as "hybrid class actions")4 1 for some time. The general approach used
was to determine if the damages sought were "incidental" to the
injunctive relief and the lower courts had developed various approaches
to determine the answer to that question. The Ninth Circuit, in which
Wal-Mart arose, had looked to whether the claims for injunctive relief
were the "predominant" form of relief sought to determine the propriety
of certification.4 9 So this case offered an opportunity for the Supreme
Court to determine how to treat these hybrid cases, potentially either
making it more difficult to certify them or endorsing lower-court efforts
to allow certification under certain circumstances.
The Court unanimously held that Rule 23(b) (2) was not available
and that the back-pay claims could be certified only if the district court
determined that they met the predominance and superiority
requirements of Rule 23(b) (3).so The Court also went on to hold that
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547-49.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) (2-3).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
41 See 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 4, at § 1784.1.
4
See Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2003). This approach
actually was endorsed by the advisory committee. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's
note to 1966 amendment, reprinted in 12A CHARLEs ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 235, 238-39 (2011). But Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, specifically rejected any reliance on that history, noting that the Court
interprets the rule and that the committee note cannot change the rule. Wal-Mart,
131 S. Ct. at 2559.
50 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558-59. The four dissenting Justices agreed that the
action, if certifiable, should have been considered under Rule 23(b) (3) and that that
issue should be reserved for remand. Id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). However, as Justice Ginsburg observed, the Court "disqualifies the
class at the starting gate, holding that the plaintiffs cannot cross the 'commonality' line
set by Rule 23(a) (2)." Id. at 2562.
4

4
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predominance could not be satisfied for the back-pay claims because of
the existence of affirmative defenses to the employees' claims that
required individualized hearings and that could not be resolved
appropriately using a sampling procedure.5 '
In contrast, the Court split 5-4 on the second issue-the application
of the Rule 23(a) (2) common-question requirement. Justice Scalia, who
wrote for the five-member majority, found that the requirement was not
satisfied, setting forth a new definition of what needed to be shown to do
so, while justice Ginsburg wrote for the dissent in part.2
The Court's holdings on both issues surprised many. This is because,
although the question of hybrid class certifications was certainly
percolating in the lower courts, those courts were virtually uniform in
finding that back-pay claims were incidental to any injunctive relief
sought in an employment-discrimination suit and that they did not
prevent certification under Rule 23(b) (2) . Yet all nine members of the
Court disagreed with this long-established conclusion. Further, the
appropriate standard for determining compliance with Rule 23(a) (2) was
a question raised not by the parties, but by the Court when it granted
certiorari,55 and Justice Scalia's elaboration of why Rule 23(a) (2) was not
satisfied presents a new, complicated threshold analysis for a prerequisite
on which most lower courts had not placed much emphasis. Thus, the
Court's rationale for its decision bears close scrutiny as both holdings
represent major changes in the application of Rule 23.
In the Court's treatment of the back-pay claims, Justice Scalia
rejected any Rule 23(b) (2) standard that looked to whether the
injunctive relief predominated or whether back-pay claims themselves
should be deemed equitable and thus within the scope of subdivision
(b) (2). Just as he did in his Shady Grove opinion, he looked to the
language of the rule and found nothing there to support those
interpretations. Justice Scalia recognized that in some instances Rule
Id. at 2561 (majority opinion).
The other members of the majority were: Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Id. at 2546.
" Id. at 2552-57. The other dissenters were: Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan. Id. at 2546.
See, for example, the cases cited in 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 4,
at § 1775 n.34.
15 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010).
5 See 7AWRIGHT, MILLER& KANE, supra note 4, at § 1763 & nn.6-11.
5 "Of course it is the Rule itself, not the Advisory Committee's description of it,
that governs. And a mere negative inference does not in our view suffice to establish a
disposition that has no basis in the Rule's text, and that does obvious violence to the
Rule's structural features. The mere 'predominance' of a proper (b) (2) injunctive
claim does nothing tojustify elimination of Rule 23(b) (3)'s procedural protections: It
neither establishes the superiority of class adjudication over individual adjudication
nor cures the notice and opt-out problems. We fail to see why the Rule should be
read to nullify these protections whenever a plaintiff class, at its option, combines its
monetary claims with a request-even a 'predominating request'-for an injunction."
5
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23(b) (2) certification might be utilized when incidental monetary relief
accompanied an injunction claim. But he noted that might only apply
when the damages being sought flow directly from liability to the class as
a whole and the determination of damages does not require complex
individualized determinations. This was not the case at hand and no
short-cuts could be made to avoid individual damage determinations.
The majority's application of Rule 23(a) (2) is even more broadreaching. Justice Scalia concluded that the three means by which
plaintiffs had attempted to show that discretionary decisionmaking by
managers created a general policy of discrimination presenting a core
common issue for their employment-discrimination claim did not
constitute significant proof that Wal-Mart operated within a general
policy of discrimination. His conclusion that plaintiffs had failed to
meet their burden of proof under Rule 23(a) (2) raises important
questions about what proof might possibly meet the standard. 0 Justice
Scalia's conclusion that the standard was not met also is very much tied to
the way in which he interpreted that requirement. As he saw it,
commonality requires that plaintiffs have suffered the same injury and
that means that "[t]heir claims must depend upon a common
contention.
Further, that common contention "must be of such a
nature that it is capable of classwide resolution-which means that
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to
the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." 2 To resolve whether
that standard is met, the issue then becomes whether dissimilarities
between the claims may impede a common resolution, which, in Wal-

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559. The fact that back-pay claims may be equitable in nature
also was deemed immaterial. "The Rule does not speak of 'equitable' remedies
generally but of injunctions and declaratory judgments." Id. at 2560.
" Id. at 2560. This standard for defining incidental relief was the one developed
by the Fifth Circuit in dealing with hybrid class certifications. See Allison v. Citgo
Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the Court did not
formally adopt this standard. Justice Scalia ended his opinion saying only: "And
because the necessity of that litigation will prevent backpay from being 'incidental' to
the classwide injunction, respondents' class could not be certified even assuming,
arguendo, that 'incidental' monetary relief can be awarded to a 23(b) (2) class." WalMart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552-54.
W
mJustice Scalia found the social-framework analysis inconclusive, questioning the
strength of that type of analysis altogether. As for the statistical proof of disparate
treatment, he commented, "Merely showing that Wal-Mart's policy of discretion has
produced an overall sex-based disparity does not suffice." Id. at 2556. Finally, as to the
anecdotal evidence, he discounted it because it was concentrated in only six stores
and represented "about 1 for every 12,500 class members-relating to only some 235
out of Wal-Mart's 3,400 stores." Id. Thus he concluded: "Even if every single one of
these accounts is true, that would not demonstrate that the entire company
'operate[s] under a general policy of discrimination."' Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982)).
61 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at
2551.
62

Id.
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Mart, given the size and dispersal of the class, the majority found to be
the case. Also important is the fact that Justice Scalia noted that to
analyze whether Rule 23(a) (2) is met, it is necessary to go behind the
pleadings and engage in a rigorous analysis that may require "some
overlap with the merits of the plaintiffs underlying claim." 3
In contrast, it is worth pointing out that while the dissent disagreed
with the majority's conclusions regarding the sufficiency of the evidence
64
submitted by plaintiffs to show a pattern and practice of discrimination,
it also interpreted Rule 23(a) (2) much differently, noting that there is
nothing in the rule requiring a finding that the common questions are
central to resolving the underlying case. Rather, the rule focuses the
court on whether there will be the need to review common evidence
pertinent to all the claims, which in this instance could be found by the
need to examine the particular company-wide policies and practices
alleged to affect women at all Wal-Mart stores. Thus, Justice Ginsburg
noted that Justice Scalia had blended the threshold common-question
requirement with the more stringent predominance-of-commonquestions criteria of Rule 23(b) (3) damage actions. Because the Rule
23(a) commonality requirement applies to all class actions, she opined
that the majority's interpretation potentially raises the bar for class
certification of suits seeking certification under Rules 23(b) (1) and
23(b) (2), neither of which has a predominance requirement."
The sixth and final decision I want to note is a bit different from all
the preceding. Indeed, I am not sure Court watchers were paying great
attention to it, but, given the decisions already described, it should be
easy to see why it had the potential to cause major shifts in the classaction landscape. Thus, perhaps as a cautionary tale, it seems a fitting way
63 Id. For an examination of how lower courts prior to
Wal-Mart were embracing
a merits scrutiny as part of the class certification process and what the implications of
that trend may be, see Richard Marcus, Reviving judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation:
Scrutinizing the Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv, 324, 349-71 (2011).
But to say that there must be some inquiry into the merits in order to determine that
Rule 23 is satisfied does not mean that the court must find that individual class
members have a valid claim in order to go forward. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d
273, 304-07 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
64 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2565 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("The evidence reviewed by the District Court adequately demonstrated that
resolving those claims would necessitate examination of particular policies and
practices alleged to affect, adversely and globally, women employed at Wal-Mart's
stores. Rule 23(a) (2), setting a necessary but not a sufficient criterion for class-action
certification, demands nothing further.").
63 Id. at 2565-67. "Because Rule 23(a) is also a prerequisite for Rule 23(b) (1) and
Rule 23(b) (2) classes, the Court's 'dissimilarities' position is far reaching. Individual
differences should not bar a Rule 23(b) (1) or Rule 23(b) (2) class, so long as the Rule
23(a) threshold is met." Id. at 2566. Justice Ginsburg also noted that the majority was
reaching out to decide an unnecessary issue and erect unnecessary roadblocks to class
certification, given the Court's holding that if the back-pay claims were to go forward,
they would need to satisfy Rule 23(b) (3) and that that issue was not before the Court,
but should have been preserved for consideration on remand. Id. at 2561-62.

2012]

GAZING INTO A CRYSTAL BALL

1027

to end this Supreme Court review. The case on which certiorari was
sought was Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott." It involved a state-court class
action against several tobacco companies on behalf of all Louisiana
smokers alleging fraud in the distortion of knowledge to the public about
the addictive effects of nicotine. Plaintiffs had been successful in the trial
court and obtained a judgment of some $250 million to fund a 10-year
smoking cessation program. The tobacco companies sought Supreme
Court review alleging many due-process violations in the way the case was
handled below. They also obtained a stay of the judgment from Justice
Scalia while certiorari was pending.
The grounds for obtaining a stay from a Supreme Court justice are:
(1) that there is a reasonable probability that certiorari will be granted;
(2) that there is a significant possibility that the judgment will be
reversed; and (3) that, assuming the applicant's position on the merits is
correct, there is a likelihood of irreparable harm if the judgment is not
stayed." Justice Scalia found all three requirements satisfied and, in
particular, noted one asserted error below that might merit review and
reversal." As he described it, Louisiana fraud law typically requires proof
defendant's
on the
plaintiff detrimentally relied
that the
misrepresentations. But the Louisiana appellate court had held that
although that element would need to be proved if plaintiffs sought
individual damages, it did not need to be proved insofar as the plaintiffs
7
were seeking payment into a fund that would benefit all plaintiffs. o The
result of this interpretation of Louisiana law was that defendants were
deprived of the reliance defense. This holding, Justice Scalia asserted,
"implicates constitutional constraints on the allowable alteration of
As he put it, the consequence of the
normal process in class actions.
Louisiana court's holding was "that individual plaintiffs who could not
recover had they sued separately can recover only because their claims
were aggregated with others' through the procedural device of the class
action.
Of note is the fact that this statement parallels Justice Scalia's
treatment of the lower court's determination in Wal-Mart that the backpay awards could not be made using a sampling technique rather than
relying on individual proceedings. There he ruled that because the
defendant had the right to raise individual affirmative defenses to any

* 131 S. Ct. 1 (Scalia, Circuitjustice 2010).
6
Id. at 2-3.
* Id. at 3.
" Id.
Id. ("Thus, the court eliminated any need for plaintiffs to prove, and denied
7
any opportunity for applicants to contest, that any particular plaintiff who benefits
from the judgment (much less all of them) believed applicants' distortions and
continued to smoke as a result.").
71 Id.
72 Id. at
4.
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back-pay claims in a pattern-or-practice suit, "a class cannot be certified
on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory
defenses to individual claims," or Rule 23 would violate the Rules
Enabling Act.7 3 On June 27, 2011, the Court acted in Philip Morris,
denying certiorari. Justice Scalia apparently was not successful in
persuading three other justices to take up the issue in this other context,
and PhilipMorris can be viewed as the case that got away! But the broader
issue of what constitutional limits the Court might impose on the lower
courts when they are adapting ways to present evidence in order to allow
class actions to be certified clearly looms in the future.
III. SEARCH FOR A COMMON THEME: A PATH NOT TAKEN
Having described the array of class-action cases decided by the Court
since 2010, the question becomes whether there is an identifiable
common theme or theory underlying them. As stated at the outset, this is
what I had thought we might be able to discern from such a significant
cluster of cases in the class-action arena. However, gazing into a crystal
ball carries significant risks. Having looked at the Court's rationales, the
results reached, and the kinds of issues presented, I must confess that I
have not been able to identify any such major or broad theoretical
underpinnings in the Court's recent class-action rulings. Rather, the
cases appear to be very tied to the individual issues or circumstances
presented. Thus, the possibility that the Supreme Court might be
developing through these cases a new class-action jurisprudence or a
central theory of class actions to guide modern litigation appears
unlikely, as no such path is readily apparent. Indeed, even broad themes
are difficult to ascertain. Let me briefly explain why.
Early news accounts or comments after some of the decisions were
announced expressed, either with great dismay or with applause, that it
now was clear the Court was "anti-class actions" or was developing classaction law to reflect a pro-business or anti-consumer bias.7 Consideration
of all of the cases together belies that simple conclusion, however. It is
true that if the only cases the Court had decided were AT&T Mobility and
Wal-Mart, then those concerns might appear more viable since both cases
reveal the majority's concerns about whether the class-action device is
appropriately utilized in certain kinds of cases. Thus, they raise the
question whether a majority of the Court might be moving in the
direction of limiting the availability of class relief accordingly. This is

7

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011); see also Rules

Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
" Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 3057 (2011).
7
See, e.g., Arthur H. Bryant, Editorial, Class Actions Are Not Dead Yet, NAT'L L.J.,
June 20, 2011, at 46; John C. Coffee Jr., The Future (ifAny) of Class Litigation After 'WalMart,'NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 2011, at 12; Editorial, The Wal-Mart Ripple Effect, WALL ST.J.,
Oct. 18, 2011, at A36.
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particularly so since both cases were decided on a 5-4 split, with the same
justices appearing in the majority and dissent. Further support for that
conclusion is that the majority in AT&T Mobility completely rejected any
notion of class arbitration, using language suggesting that class actions
sometimes cause more burdens than efficiencies. 1 And, in Wal-Mart, the
majority significantly increased the threshold needed to satisfy the
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) (2). Moreover, the Court
unanimously held that the back-pay claims could not be deemed
incidental relief and, if they were to go forward, must meet the
predominance-of-common-questions requirement of Rule 23(b) (3)-a
much higher threshold. Based on those two decisions alone, fears of an
anti-class action or a pro-business tilt could be viewed as well-grounded.
However, when you examine those cases in the context of the other classaction cases that the Court decided, the answer is not so clear.
Consider, for example, that in Shady Grove the Court prevented New
York State from attempting to limit penalty class actions, holding that
federal Rule 23 controlled and contained no such limitation. Further, in
Smith v. Bayer, the Court held that a federal court cannot enjoin a
pending state consumer class action on the ground that it had denied
class certification to what was essentially an identical case. In both
instances, consumers were allowed to utilize the class-action device
despite major objections raised by the business community.
More generally, with regard to whether the Court revealed a desire
to restrict class actions or displayed, as some would call it, an anti-classaction bias, three of the Court's decisions suggest otherwise, or at least
that the Court is neutral on the question. Again, Shady Grove allows Rule
23 to be utilized despite state efforts to control certain class actions
deemed abusive." And in Smith v. Bayer, the Court's conclusion that an
injunction against redundant and overlapping class actions was not
proper means that the potential for multiple and duplicative state and
78
federal class-action filings will continue. This is so even though the
Court recognized that tying the federal courts' hands may be inefficient
"[T]he switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal
advantage of arbitration-its informality-and makes the process slower, more costly,
and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment." AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011).
" Justice Scalia has authored two contrasting 5-4 decisions. Compare Shady Grove
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) (upholding
the application of Rule 23 and the ability to certify the class, despite state law
restrictions), with Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560-61 (2011) (raising the standards for
satisfying Rule 23(a)(2) and ruling certification improper). The contrast between
these two cases challenges the notion of an over-arching bias or theme, other than
perhaps Justice Scalia's known preference to interpret the language of rules or
statutes strictly, rather than looking to outside sources and policies to provide
interpretative guides.
71 Justice Kagan did opine, however, that if there were multiple federal court
filings, she hoped comity would persuade the remaining federal courts to rule
accordingly. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 (2011).
76
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and wasteful, and certainly the business community argued strongly
against the status quo. Despite these recognized outcomes, the ability to
limit class-action filings was deemed to be outside the power of the
federal courts to address, and the unnamed members of the class in a
federal action may not be prevented from raising their class claims
elsewhere once the federal court denies certification. 9 Finally, in Erica P.
John Fund, the Court adhered to much earlier precedent allowing the
predominance requirement in securities-fraud class actions to be satisfied
by a showing that there had been a fraud on the market, and it declined
to restrict securities-fraud class actions by adopting the Fifth Circuit's
requirement that loss causation, which was deemed an issue that needed
to be proved individually, had to be shown before certification could be
authorized." And, although a denial of certiorari cannot be interpreted
as sending any particular message, it is at least interesting to note that the
Court declined the opportunity in Philip Morris to rule on the question
whether the states, in actions premised on state law, could adapt their
proof requirements to facilitate class actions as against the concerns
raised by Justice Scalia, suggesting that to do so might implicate the dueprocess rights of the defendant businesses.
Another broad question that underlies the three consumer cases is
the relationship between the federal and state courts and federal and
state law. Remember that the Court, in two 5-4 decisions, held that Rule
23 controls over conflicting state law, which attempted to restrict the
availability of class relief, and it also held that a federal statute controls
over state law that would authorize class arbitrations in small consumer
contract cases. But while federal law appeared to be favored in these
situations, a unanimous Court in Smith v. Bayer upheld the right of the
state courts to determine for themselves whether to certify a consumer
damages class action even after a federal court had determined that the
action could not be certified under criteria that were similar. And the
Court refused to take up the question whether there were restrictions on
state courts that want to develop or modify their proof standards to
accommodate classwide determinations in products-liability suits. So,
here too, the picture or direction is not clearly marked.
For these reasons, I have concluded that there is no overarching
theme or theory underlying the Court's most recent class-action
jurisprudence. Rather, these cases presented circumstances that allowed
the Court to develop differing determinations, some of which may

7 Id. at 2379 & n.10.
'0 The Court's decision is a very narrow one, however. Thus, it left open the
possibility that class certification could be denied on remand if it was determined that
the alleged misrepresentations did not affect the company's stock price in the first
place so no fraud on the market would have occurred, and it declined to rule on
other questions raised by the application of the fraud-on-the-market approach to
proving fraud in a class context.
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appear to be class-action friendly and others of which appear to favor
class opponents.
But the fact that no macro-theory appears does not mean that this
cluster of cases is not extremely significant, particularly because they raise
so many different issues at the heart of class litigation. Thus, it is
important to look at how the lower courts and litigants are applying the
rules the Court has announced to see how the cases have impacted the
class-action landscape.
Even though only a few months have passed since most of these
decisions were announced,81 the early lower court results may suggest the
potential longer-term impact of these decisions, and it is to that inquiry
that I now turn.
IV. THE IMPACT ON CLASS LITIGATION IN THE LOWER COURTS
I must begin my analysis of the lower courts' treatment of these
new Supreme Court class-action rulings by recognizing that it will be
difficult, if not impossible, to assess with any degree of accuracy the
impact of the Court's rulings in two of its cases-EricaP. John Fund v.
Halliburton Co. and Smith v. Bayer Corp. This is because in each case the
Court effectively allowed class actions to go forward, refusing either to
adopt stricter proof requirements for securities-fraud class actions in the
812
Erica P. John case, or to allow federal courts to enjoin overlapping or
duplicative class actions when they determined that a class could not be
certified under Rule 23. Obviously, as a result of both rulings, class
certifications that before may have been refused as a result of those
proposed restrictions now may proceed more readily. Thus, some lower
courts have acknowledged that it now is clear that plaintiffs in securitiesfraud actions need not prove loss causation at the class-certification
stage. Other courts have acknowledged that it now is not possible to
enjoin parallel or subsequent state class actions under the relitigation
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act8 5 or they have held that federal class
relitigation also must be allowed given the Court's ruling that class-

" For purposes of this brief review, I have included only cases decided by
December 31, 2011.
8' See the discussion at notes 28-33 supra.

See the discussion at notes 34-42 supra.
8 See, e.g., In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivatives & ERISA Litig., MDL No. 1658
(SRC), 2011 WL 3444199, at *29 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011); Penn. Ave. Funds v. Inyx Inc.,
No. 08 Civ. 6857(PKC), 2011 HIL 2732544, at *7-8 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y July 5, 2011); see
also Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co., 73 So. 3d 91, 111 (Fla. 2011).
85 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Greenmoor, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of
Am., Civil Action No. 06-234, 2011 WL 4915860, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2011);
Rhodes v. Advanced Prop. Mgmt. Inc., Civil No. 3:10-cv-826 (JCH), 2011 WL
3204597, at *1-2 (D. Conn.July 26, 2011); Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 806 F. Supp. 2d
1030, 1038-39 (E.D. Mich. 2011); see alsoAnti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
1
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certification denials cannot bind absent class members." But actually
determining whether class suits may increase as a result of these rulings
would be difficult to document. This is because it is to be expected that,
except for actions that were pending when the Supreme Court issued its
decisions, now that the law on these issues is clear, class actions simply
will be filed without any challenges on these grounds. Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude that in removing two potential barriers to class
certification, the Court may have eased the burden on class plaintiffs.
However, just what that means in terms of increased class litigation is not
readily quantifiable.
The remaining three class-action cases decided by the Court have
posed greater interpretative questions for the lower courts and offer
more potential for insights into how far reaching the Court's rulings may
be. In particular, two important questions are presented. The first is the
extent to which states retain the authority to either limit or authorize
class relief. The second is whether the Rule 23 requirements now should
be interpreted to include heightened standards that may restrict or
otherwise limit the scope of available class relief both inside and outside
the employment-discrimination field. The answers to these questions
obviously may suggest some major shifts in class-action practice as it had
evolved prior to these most recent Supreme Court decisions.
Starting first with the Court's 2010 decision in Shady Grove, although
several courts have invoked that decision to rule that the Rule 23
requirements are the exclusive means of determining the availability of
817
class relief despite conflicting state law, others have distinguished the

" See, e.g., In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Tools Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 05
C 4742, 2011 WL 2745772, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2011) ("It is true that the Court in
Smith dealt exclusively with relitigation of the class-certification issue in state court.
But the Court's ruling that denials of class certification are not binding on putative
class members is equally applicable to relitigation in federal court.").
1
Some courts have focused on the fact that "[s]atisfaction of [the Rule 23]
requirements . . . categorically entitles a plaintiff to pursue her claim as a class action."
Subedi v. Merchant, No. 09 C 4525, 2010 WL 1978693, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2010);
see also Nicholson v. UTi Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:09-cv-722-JPG-DGW, 2011 WL 1775726,
at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 10, 2011); Neil v. Zell, 275 F.R.D. 256, 260 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Mezyk
v. U.S. Bank Pension Plan, Nos. 3:09-cv-384-JPG, 3:10-cv-696-JPG, 2011 WL 601653, at
*4 (S.D. Ill. Feb 11, 2011); Feinman v. FBI, 269 F.R.D. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 2010); In re
AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Litig., 270 F.R.D. 330, 340 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
Others have stressed that "Rule 23 is 'valid in all jurisdictions, with respect to all
claims, regardless of its incidental effect upon state-created rights."' Am. Copper &
Brass, Inc. v. Lake City Indus. Prods., Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1162, 2010 WL 2998472, at *3
(W.D. Mich. July 28, 2010) (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010)).
Still others stress that "Rule 23 'provides a one-size-fits-all formula for deciding
the class-action question.'" In re Wash. Mut. Mortg. Backed Sec. Litig., 276 F.R.D. 658,
664 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (quoting Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437); see also, e.g., Pimental
v. Dreyfus, No. CI1-119 MJP, 2011 WL 321778, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2011); G.M.
Sign, Inc. v. Brink's Mfg. Co., No. 09 C 5528, 2011 WL 248511, at *3 (N.D. Ill.Jan. 25,
2011); In re Wash. Mut., Inc. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., Nos. 2:08-md-1919 MJP,
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case based on the statutes or issues involved. For example, in a Second
Circuit case under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA),"
which the Supreme Court had remanded to be reconsidered in light of
Shady Grove, the appellate court held that unlike Shady Grove, the TCPA
created a unique federal claim using state law to define the federal claim
and that Congress intended some state rules to define what causes of
action could exist under the statute."9 The court concluded: "Congress
intended to give states a fair measure of control over solving the
problems that the TCPA addresses. The ability to define when a class
cause of action lies and when it does not is part of that control."" Thus,
the same New York law that was deemed generally inapplicable in Shady
Grove applied to TCPA actions and barred class relief. Similarly, courts
have examined other state statutes and found them to be substantive and
thus controlling, barring class relief even though Rule 23 might
otherwise be satisfied. Courts also have allowed an action to go forward
under a state private attorney general law without requiring class
certification under Rule 23.

C08-387 MJP, 2010 WL 4272567, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 2010); Elkins v. Dreyfus,
No. C10-1366 MJP, 2010 WL 3947499, at *5 (W.D.Wash. Oct. 6, 2010).
8
47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006).
Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 618 F.3d 214, 217-18 (2d Cir. 2010).
0 Id. at 218 (per Calabresi,J.).
" Notably, this interpretation of the TCPA was rejected by the Third Circuit,
which held that, because a federal statute was involved, only Rule 23 was relevant and
state law need not be consulted. See Landsman & Funk PC v. Skinder-Strauss Assocs.,
640 F.3d 72, 91 (3d Cir. 2011).
" See, for example, cases applying the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 627.736(10) (a) (West 2011): DWFII Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 271 F.R.D. 676, 684 (S.D. Fla. 2010)-the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 10/7(2) (West 1993): In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig., 812 F. Supp. 2d
390, 415 (S.D.N.Y 2011); In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 670, 677
(E.D. Pa. 2010)-the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.09 (West 2004): Kline v. Mortg. Elec. Sec. Sys., No. 3:08cv408, 2010 WL
6298271, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 2010); McKinney v. Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d
733, 748-49 (N.D. Ohio 2010); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 1:08-WP-65000, 2010 WL 2756947, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 2010)and the Consumer Protection Act of 1977, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(a) (1) (Supp.
2011): Tait v. BSH Home Appliances Corp., No. SACV 10-711 DOC (ANx), 2011 WL
1832941, at *9 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2011); Bearden v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., No. 3:091035, 2010 WL 3239285, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 16, 2010).
" See cases applying the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of
2004, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698-2699.5 (West 2011): Cardenas v. McLane Foodservice,
Inc., No. SACV 10-473 DOC (FFMx), 2011 WL 379413, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31,
2011); Mendez v. Tween Brands, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00072-MCE-DAD, 2010 WL
2650571, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010). But see Thompson v. APM Terminals Pac. Ltd.,
No. C 10-00677 JSW, 2010 WL 6309364, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010) ("To the
extent Plaintiff here seeks to bring a representative PAGA action on behalf of other
non-party, unnamed aggrieved employees in federal court, such a claim must meet
the requirements of Rule 23.").
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Other state procedures also have been deemed applicable despite
their absence from Rule 23. Thus, the Fifth Circuit rejected a claim that
the district court had to permit a cy pres distribution of a class settlement
to proceed rather than allowing Texas to claim the funds under its
unclaimed property laws. The court found that Rule 23(e) governing
class settlements did not mention cy pres distributions, and therefore did
not directly conflict with state law, that the state unclaimed property law
was substantive, and thus that state law should be applied. And the
Fourth Circuit refused to interpret Shady Grove as creating an absolute
entitlement to proceed as a class action despite plaintiffs' failure to
exhaust their administrative remedies, as required under state law.9 5
In short, it appears that Shady Grove has not resulted in the lower
courts simply ignoring state requirements, procedural or substantive, and
relying solely on Rule 23 to determine the propriety of class relief.
Although, as would be expected, there are some courts that have invoked
96
the case as stating a categorical rule, many others have continued to
engage in a more nuanced analysis of the relevant state law, as well as the
Rule 23 standards. And those courts have concluded that, at least in some
circumstances, state law should control and may bar class relief. Thus,
while Shady Grove may suggest additional layers of analysis that must be
considered before deciding to apply state law, it has not resulted in the
federal courts simply ignoring state interests and policies when deciding
whether state law may be applied and state regulatory interests furthered.
The impact of AT&T Mobility's conclusion that California's state rule
holding class-action arbitration waivers in consumer contracts
unenforceable was in conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has
been more dramatic. Lower courts applying AT&T Mobility have been
uniform in finding that plaintiffs now are prevented from arguing that
class-action waivers in consumer contracts are unenforceable under state
law.97 The courts have recognized that the Supreme Court left open the
possibility for class arbitration if the parties actually provided for it in

All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 333-34 (5th Cir. 2011).
Mitchell-Tracey v. United Gen. Title Ins. Co., 442 F. App'x 2, 6 (4th Cir. 2011)
("[We cannot] discern any basis on which to read [Shady Grove] as excusing named
class-action plaintiffs from the threshold procedural requirements that they would
face as individual litigants."); see also Woods v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., Civil No. CCB06-705, 2010 WL 3395655, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 26, 2010).
'6 See supra note 87.
17
See, e.g., Chavez v. Bank of Am., No. C 10-653 JCS, 2011 WL 4712204, at *4-5
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); Adams v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 108889 (W.D. Wash. 2011); In re Gateway LX6810 Computer Prods. Litig., No. SACV 101563-JST (JEMx), 2011 WL 3099862, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2011); In re Cal. Title
Ins. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-01341 JSW, 2011 WL 2566449, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. June 27,
2011); Wolf v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., No. 10-cv-3338 (NLH) (KMW), 2011
WL 2490939, at *6-7 (D.N.J. June 22, 2011); Wallace v. Ganley Auto Grp., No. 95081,
2011 WL 2434093, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 2011); Bernal v. Burnett, 793
F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1287-88 (D. Colo. 2011).
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their contracte-albeit this is an unlikely prospect given the business
community's control over most of the contract language and its desire, as
witnessed in AT&T Mobility itself, to avoid class proceedings. Other
courts also have noted that while a state rule mandating the availability of
class arbitration based on the generalized nature of consumer-protection
claims now is clearly preempted by the FAA,9 a plaintiff still may seek to
invalidate or avoid a class-action waiver by showing that the contract itself
is unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable under traditional contract
doctrine.'" However, the fact that a class-action waiver is part of the
contract is not in and of itself unconscionable.'o' Further, factual or
statistical evidence showing that in the absence of class proceedings a
plaintiff would not be able to obtain an attorney because it would not be
cost effective to pursue the claim unless it was aggregated with others is
not enough to avoid FAA preemption. 02 This is because AT&TMobility is
viewed as expressly rejecting the public policy arguments against classaction waivers, whether substantiated by facts or not, as insufficient to
overcome the FAA's objective of enforcing arbitration agreements by
their terms, as long as they are found to be valid contracts.
So the power of the states to regulate the consumer-protection field
and, in particular, to rely on class procedures as a means of ensuring
broad enforcement of those protections has been seriously limited by

" Bergman v. Spruce Peak Realty, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-127, 2011 WL 5523329, at
*4 (D. Vt. Nov. 14, 2011); Yahoo! Inc. v. Iverson, No. 11-CV-03282-LHK, 2011 WL
4802840, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011).
" See Litman v. Cellco P'ship, 655 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2011); Cruz v. Cingular
Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011).
'" See Unimax Express, Inc. v. Cosco N. Am., Inc., No. CV 11-02947 DDP
(PLAx), 2011 WL 5909881, *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011); Palmer v. Infosys Techs. Ltd.,
Civil Action No. 2:11cv217-MHT, 2011 WL 5434258, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 9,2011); In
re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 813 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2011),
vacated on other grounds, 674 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2012); Saincome v. Truly Nolen of
Am., Inc., No. 11-CV-825-JM (BGS), 2011 WL 3420604, at *1, *4-10 (S.D. Cal. Aug.
3, 2011); Kanbar v. O'Melveny & Meyers, No. C--11-0892 EMC, 2011 WL 2940690, at
*8-9 (N.D. Cal.,July 21, 2011); Hamby v. Power Toyota Irvine, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1163,
1164-65 (S.D. Cal. 2011); Hopkins v. World Acceptance Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1339,
1348 (N.D. Ga. 2011); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 28-30
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 2629 (Cal. March 21, 2011);
Moran v. Superior Court, No. F061801, 2011 WL 5560178, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov.
16, 2011); NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777, 791-92
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
"o' See Litman, 655 F.3d at 232; Hamby, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1164 & n.1; Bellows v.
Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., No. 09CV1951-LAB (WMc), 2011 WL 1691323, at *3
(S.D. Cal. May 4, 2011).
102 See Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048-50 (N.D. Cal.
2011); Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1214-15. But see In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d
204, 214, 217 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that an arbitration clause rejecting class
arbitration was invalid in an antitrust suit when plaintiffs showed that the practical
effect was to prevent their ability to vindicate federal statutory rights through
arbitration).
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AT&T Mobility, 10 as has the expansion of class procedures into the
arbitration arena. Whether the concerns expressed by the Court's
majority in AT&T Mobility about the inherent inconsistency of class
arbitrations with the efficiency and streamlined character of arbitration
are viewed as legitimate or not, the Court by its expansive reading of the
FAA clearly prevented states from experimenting with the remedy and
determining whether it was consistent with their own public policy goals.
The last case to be examined, and the one which in many ways has
the potential of having the 1reatest impact on future class litigation, is
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v. Dukes. As will be remembered, that case held that
the back-pay claims in an employment-discrimination class action under
Title VII could not be considered as incidental to the injunctive relief
being sought, and the claims had to meet the requirements of Rule
23(b) (3) to be certified as a class. Additionally, the standard for meeting
the common-question requirement under Rule 23(a) (2) was redefined to
require a centralized common question that could be proved in a
common, rather than individualized, fashion. And this standard requires
the courts to scrutinize rigorously the proof that may be introduced to
meet that burden.
The first question is whether an action ever may be certified under
Rule 23(b) (2) for injunctive or declaratory relief when monetary relief
also is being sought. The Wal-Mart Court rejected the approach that
certification under Rule 23(b) (2) might be deemed appropriate as long
as the injunctive relief being sought predominated over any monetary
relief being requested. o0However, the Court's concerns related in many

0'

In cases outside the consumer field, some courts, however, have distinguished

AT&T Mobility and found that enforcement of an arbitration agreement would
interfere with other substantive rights. See, e.g., Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128
Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding public right to sue under the
Private Attorneys General Act cannot be subject to waiver by an arbitration
agreement); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS) (JCF), 2011
WL 2671813, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011) (denying defendant's motion to
reconsider ruling allowing Title VII plaintiffs to arbitrate a "pattern or practice"
employment-discrimination claim on a class-wide basis); see also Urbino v. Orkin Servs.
of Cal., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-06456-CJC(PJWx), 2011 WL 4595249, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
5, 2011). It also has been held that claims for injunctive relief under the California
Consumer Legal Remedies Act are distinguishable from those in AT&T Mobility as
plaintiff is acting as a private attorney general and California law providing that those
injunction claims are not subject to arbitration could be applied. In re DirecTV Early
Cancellation Fee Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1072-73 (C.D.
Cal. 2011). But not all courts agree. See In re Apple & AT&T iPad Unlimited Data Plan
Litig., No. C-10-02553 RMW, 2011 WL 2886407, at * 4 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2011);
Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 10-05663 WHA, 2011 WL 1842712, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. May 16, 2011).
See the discussion at notes 43-65 supra.
1's "The mere 'predominance' of a proper (b) (2) injunctive claim does nothing
to justify elimination of Rule 23(b) (3)'s procedural protections: It neither establishes
the superiority of class adjudication over individualadjudication nor cures the notice
and opt-out problems. We fail to see why the Rule should be read to nullify these

GAZING INTO A CRYSTAL BALL

2012]

1037

respects to the facts of the back-pay claims that were involved. Thus, it
noted that to hold otherwise would create "perverse incentives" for class
representatives to abandon other monetary claims and limit themselves
to back pay and would require the district court to constantly reevaluate
the roster of class members to ensure that all members remained
employed at defendant's company so as to be eligible for injunctive or
declaratory relief.1 o6 Further, the Court did not expressly preclude all
monetary claims from being asserted in the context of a Rule 23(b) (2)
suit. Indeed, it noted, without deciding whether it was appropriate, that
the Fifth Circuit1o7 had allowed Rule 23(b) (2) certification when the
monetary relief was deemed "incidental" to the injunctive relief sought.1 08
In that case incidental relief was defined as "damages that flow directly
from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the
injunctive or declaratory relief."1 However, Justice Scalia noted that the
back-pay claims could not be certified under Rules 23(b) (2) "at least
where (as here) the monetary relief is not incidental to the injunctive or
declaratory relief.",,o
Given those qualifications, perhaps it is not surprising that some
lower courts in cases presenting claims for both injunctive and monetary
relief have continued to evaluate whether the monetary relief may be
deemed incidental and the action certified under Rule 23(b) (2)."' The
key is whether those monetary claims are sufficiently cohesive so that
individual proceedings are not necessary to determine them.1 12 Indeed,

protections whenever a plaintiff class, at its option, combines its monetary claims with
a request-even a 'predominating request'-for an injunction." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011).
106
107

Id.

Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998).
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560.

* Allison, 151 F.3d at 415.

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
.. See, e.g., Wu v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 255, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(holding that copyright damage claims are not incidental); Delarosa v. Boiron, Inc.,
275 F.R.D. 582, 592-93 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that actual damages, punitive
damages, and set statutory damages are incidental, but statutory damages requiring
individual findings of harm are not incidental); see also Ellis v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 987 (9th Cir. 2011) (vacating and remanding class certification
in light of Wal-Mart and instructing the lower court to consider whether punitive
damages may be certified as incidental relief under Rule 23(b) (2), but requiring any
certification of compensatory damages and back-pay claims under Rule 23(b) (3)).
"' Compare Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 263 (3d Cir. 2011)
(describing lower court's holding that medical monitoring and property damage
claims in a toxic-tort action could not be certified under Rule 23(b) (2).), with In re
Conseco Life Ins. Co. Life Trend Ins. Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig., No. C 10-02124 SI,
2011 WL 6372412, at *6, *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2011) (allowing a suit by current
insurance policy holders seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent ongoing
or future premium requirements and increased charges, as well as the return of past
improper deductions from their accounts to be certified under Rule 23(b) (2)
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even back-pay claims have been certified under subdivision (b) (2) when
the court found that, unlike Wal-Mart, they did not require individualized
determinations or defenses.' 13 Other courts have applied Wal-Mart more
rigidly, holding that it is appropriate to certify only the issues relating to
liability and classwide declaratory and injunctive relief under Rule
23(b) (2); all other claims must satisfy Rule 23(b) (3) ." And yet other

courts have found that Wal-Mart also applies to certification under Rule
23(b)(1)"' and that monetary claims under that subdivision are also
inappropriate unless they are incidental."'
In sum, most of these early lower court decisions do not appear to
have interpreted the Supreme Court's decision as completely barring
certification of mixed injunction/monetary claims under Rule 23(b) (2).
Indeed, the results in these cases actually are consistent with the range of
results and approaches taken before Wal-Mart."' This includes either
bifurcating the claims being asserted under Rule 23(b) (2) and 23(b) (3)
because the claims for past deductions "are formulaic and objectively calculable"
from defendant's records and therefore incidental).
11 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., No. C 08-05186 CW,
2011 WL 5242977, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011) ("Plaintiffs in this case are not
situated dissimilarly to one another, as the plaintiffs were found to be in Dukes.....
The variations in the modes of travel of Plaintiffs here, which affect the extent of AC
Transit's liability for unpaid travel time, are more limited than the discretionary
decision-making that led to failures to promote employees in Dukes."); Cronas v. Willis
Grp. Holdings, Ltd., No. 06 Civ. 15295(RMB), 2011 WL 5007976, at *4 (S.D.N.Y Oct.
18, 2011) ("In contrast to Wal-Mart, Defendants here have agreed in the Revised
Proposed Consent Decree that [t]he allocation [of backpay to class members] will be
done by formula ... [so] that Defendants have no remaining right to raise individual
defenses or seek individualized determinations of back pay, which was the concern of
the Court in Wal-Mart." (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
114 See, e.g., United States v. City of New York, 276 F.R.D. 22, 33 (E.D.N.Y
2011)
(Rule 23(b) (2) cannot cover claims for individualized relief. "In so holding, a
unanimous Supreme Court reduced to rubble more than forty years of precedent in
the Courts of Appeals, which had long held that backpay is recoverable in
employment discrimination class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2)."); see also
Easterling v. Conn. Dep't of Corr., 278 F.R.D. 41, 47 (D. Conn. 2011); Fosmire v.
Progressive Max Ins. Co., 277 F.R.D. 625, 635-36 (W.D. Wash. 2011); Bouaphakeo v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-04009-JAJ, 2011 WL 3793962, at *3-4 (N.D. Iowa Aug.
25, 2011).
"1
Rule 23(b)(1) allows certification when "prosecuting separate actions by or
against individual class members would create a risk of: (A) inconsistent or varying
adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or (B)
adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter,
would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) (1).
"s See, e.g., Daskalea v. Wash. Humane Soc'y, 275 F.R.D. 346, 364 (D.D.C. 2011);
Altier v. Worley Catastrophe Response, LLC, Civil Action Nos. 11-241, 11-242, 2011
WL 3205229, at *14-15 (E.D. La.July 26, 2011).
' See generally 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER& KANE, supra note 4, at § 1784.1.
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or focusing more closely on whether the monetary relief flows directly
from the injunctive relief and whether it can be awarded without
multiple individual determinations.
A critical question that remains is just what forms of aggregate proof
can be used to prove class damage claims so as to be able to deem them
incidental to the injunctive relief being sought. In Wal-Mart itself, the
Court specifically noted that in pattern-and-practice cases the procedure
for determining individual back-pay would entail additional proceedings
at which the company could raise individual affirmative defenses to limit
the relief. Further, the Court rejected a proposed trial formula using
sample sets of class members whose back pay would be determined in
depositions supervised by a master, which would then provide a formula
to allow average back-pay awards to be calculated without individualized
proceedings. Class certification under Rule 23 using that approach would
mean that the rule was interpreted in violation of the Rules Enabling Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).118 The implications of this holding on other cases in
which courts are presented with possible techniques to allow adjudication
on a group, rather than individual, basis are large.
At least one early indication can be seen in the Third Circuit opinion
in Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co.119 The case involved a class action by
residents who alleged that defendant chemical companies dumped a
carcinogen at an industrial complex near their homes, causing damage.
The proposed class included only those with economic injury or
exposure and excluded anyone alleging physical injury or who already
had filed suit. The district court denied class certification, holding that
individual issues predominated in a medical monitoring class on the
questions of exposure, causation, and the need for medical monitoring,
and in a liability-only issue class for the property damage claims, and the
12 0
Third Circuit affirmed.
In evaluating the plaintiffs' expert evidence of how to calculate the
plaintiff class members' exposure to the chemicals, the Third Circuit

concluded:
Instead of showing the exposure of the class member with the
least amount of exposure, plaintiffs' proof would show only the
amount that hypothetical residents of the village would have been

exposed to under a uniform set of assumptions without accounting
for differences in exposure year-by-year or based upon an
individual's characteristics....

"8 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
"' 655 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J.). It is also worth noting that even prior
to Wal-Mart, the Third Circuit, in another opinion by Judge Scirica, had rendered a
key decision requiring a rigorous evaluation of expert evidence for purposes of
deciding class certification under Rule 23(b) (3). See In re Hydrogen Peroxide
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 323-24 (3d Cir. 2008). The implications of that ruling
are explored in Marcus, supra note 63, at 351-71.
12o Gates, 655 F.3d at 258,
261-62.
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Plaintiffs cannot substitute evidence of exposure of actual class
members with evidence of hypothetical, composite persons in order
to gain class certification.12 1
Thus, "[t]he evidence here is not 'common' because it is not shared by
all (possibly even most) individuals in the class. Averages or communitywide estimations would not be probative of any individual's claim because
any one class member may have an exposure level well above or below
,122
the average." The use of expert evidence premised on modeling and
assumptions not tied to the individual characteristics of class members
did not provide the necessary showing of common prooflV' and,
consequently, plaintiffs did not demonstrate the cohesiveness necessary
to allow certification.
In sum, the primary and immediate impact of the Wal-Mart Court's
decision on the application of Rule 23(b) (2) appears to be that it
eliminated the "predominance" standard as a means of determining
whether certification of hybrid claims is proper under Rule 23(b) (2) and,
in employment-discrimination class actions, it eliminated the "automatic"
classification of back-pay claims as incidental and required such claims to
receive closer scrutiny as to what they entail and whether they need to be
separately treated and certified under Rule 23(b) (3). This actually is true
for all cases presenting hybrid claims, and the expert evidence sufficient
to allow proof on a common basis in order to demonstrate the
cohesiveness necessary to support certification must be grounded in
studies that reflect the potential differences between class members.
Thus, employment discrimination back-pay claims that before were easily
certified under Rule 23(b) (2) now will have additional scrutiny and, as in
Wal-Mart itself, some will not be allowed to go forward. And all cases will
need to be determined in light of their own facts and circumstances; no
general presumptions regarding how to characterize the relief sought are
allowed. Wal-Mart also underscores that in employment-discrimination
cases seeking back pay, the scope and size of the class of employees in
actions under Rule 23(b) (2) should be carefully defined to include only
those that share highly similar positions and claims so that the back-pay
claims will not require substantial individual proof, but rather can be

Id. at 266.
Id.
23 Id. at 268 ("Plaintiffs have failed to propose a method
of proving the proper
point where exposure to vinyl chloride presents a significant risk of developing a
serious latent disease for each class member. Plaintiffs propose a single concentration
without accounting for the age of the class member being exposed, the length of
exposure, other individual factors such as medical history, or showing the exposure
was so toxic that such individual factors are irrelevant. The court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding individual issues on this point make trial as a class
unfeasible, defeating cohesion.").
122
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calculated almost mechanically.'2 4 National company-wide employee
classes, such as the one attempted in Wal-Mart, are unlikely ever to meet
this standard.
Applying the new Rule 23(a) (2) commonality standard advanced by
the majority in Wal-Mart raises additional class certification barriers and
questions. In particular, consider just four preliminary questions. First,
have lower courts in other employment-discrimination class actions been
able to find that Rule 23(a) (2) is satisfied under the heightened
"centrality" of common question standard, and, if so, how? Second, how
is the standard being applied outside the employment-discrimination
field? Third, how are the lower courts interpreting the majority's
treatment of the need to inquire into the merits and to evaluate and
weigh expert testimony that may be used to prove the merits in order to
determine the centrality of a common question satisfying Rule 23(a) (2)?
Is a full Daubert2 hearing now becoming part of all class-certification
proceedings? Fourth, and finally, is the application of this new standard
having an adverse impact on class certification in suits brought solely
under Rule 23(b) (1) or for pure injunctive or declaratory relief under
Rule 23(b) (2), as Justice Ginsburg suggested might occur in her
dissent?2 6
Not surprisingly, there have been some cases holding that Rule
23(a) (2) has not been satisfied because, after Wal-Mart, it is clear that
statistical evidence of disproportionate impact, standing alone, is not
sufficient to show that plaintiffs will be able to prove their claims on a
classwide basis,'2 or because, like Wal-Mart, the policies being challenged
depend on discretionary decisionmaking that affects each of the class
members, but that would need to be examined in light of the individual
circumstances of each claim. Yet others have allowed cases to proceed
under Rule 23, finding that they met the concerns in Wal-Mart and were
factually distinguishable from that case. For example, one court in a paydiscrimination case noted that unlike the size and dispersal of the
nationwide class in Wal-Mart, the case at hand involved only 317 women,
all employed at the same location and all at an officer level and subject to
a single ultimate decisionmaker.12 In another case, the court held that
The size and scope of future classes also is affected by the Court's
interpretation of the common-question requirement in Rule 23(a) (2). See discussion
infta notes 127-52.
125 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2566-27 (2011).
27 See Stockwell v. City of San Francisco,
No. C 08-5180 PJH, 2011 WL 4803505,
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011).
128 See Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Civil No. 08-6292
(RBK/AMD), 2011 WL
6256978, at *5, *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2011); McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc., No. 05 C 6583, 2011 WL 4471028, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19,
2011), rev'd, 672 F.3d 482 (2012) (finding Wal-Mart distinguishable).
29 See Cronas v. Willis Grp. Holdings, Ltd., No. 06 Civ. 15295(RMB), 2011 WL
5007976, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011).
2
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plaintiffs had presented significant proof of a general nondiscretionar
corporate policy disfavoring women and thus satisfied Rule 23(a) (2).
The cases that already have confronted the impact of Wal-Mart in the first
six months since it was rendered necessarily have tended to be ones that
were filed or were pending when the Supreme Court issued its decision
and thus may not meet this new threshold based on the evidence
submitted when those cases originally were filed.m' The important
question is what kinds of evidence will suffice in the future. That is why
the distinctions drawn by a few of these courts can be instructive. As
discussed later, understanding how the courts are using the merits
inquiry and evaluating expert evidence for these purposes also is critically
important. 32
When we look at cases outside the employment-discrimination field,
we find many courts that have been able to distinguish Wal-Mart because
the case before them involves a common policy that is applied uniformly
to all class members and does not depend on discretionary
decisionmakers. This has been true, for example, in wage-and-hour labor
disputes under state and federal law, where courts have noted that
uniform underlying policies are involved and that there are no
discretionary decisions by supervisors at issue. 33 Similar reasoning and
SeeJermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 276 F.R.D. 167, 172-73 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
m Although plaintiffs were found not to have submitted significant proof of a
general policy of discrimination in light of Wal-Mart, so that a motion for class
certification was denied, the court granted a motion for pre-certification discovery to
determine if such evidence could be found in Burton v. Districtof Columbia, 277 F.R.D.
224, 230-31 (D.D.C. 2011).
112 See discussion at notes 142-52 infra.
133 See, e.g., Youngblood v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.,
No. 09 Civ. 3176(RMB),
2011 WL 4597555, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011); Nehmelman v. Penn Nat'1 Gaming,
Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 745, 755-56 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Harris v. Smithfield Packing Co.,
No. 4:09-CV-41-H(1), 2011 WL 4443024, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 2011); Delagarza
v. Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co., No. C-09-5803 EMC, 2011 WL 4017967, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 8, 2011); Gales v. Winco Foods, No. C 09-05813 CRB, 2011 WL 3794887, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2011); Nguyen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 275 F.R.D. 596, 600-01
(C.D. Cal. 2011); Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-04009-JAJ, 2011 WL
3793962, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 25, 2011); Eddings v. Health Net, Inc., No. CV 101744-JST (RZx), 2011 WL 4526675, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2011); Ramos v.
SimplexGrinnell LP, 796 F. Supp. 2d 346, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Alonzo v. Maximus,
Inc., 275 F.R.D. 513, 520-24 (C.D. Cal. 2011), motion for reconsiderationdenied, No. CV
08-6755-JST (MANx), 2011 WL 3802769, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011). In
collective actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act, courts have ruled that because
the "similarly situated" standard under that statute is distinct from Rule 23(a)(2)'s
commonality requirement, the latter requirement and the Wal-Mart Court's
heightened scrutiny of it are inapplicable. See Robinson v. Ryla Teleservices, Inc., No.
CA 11-131-KD-C, 2011 WL 6667338, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 21, 2011); Ware v. TMobile USA, 828 F. Supp. 2d 948, 955-56 (M.D. Tenn. 2011); Faust v. Comcast Cable
Commc'ns Mgmt., LLC, Civil Action No. WMN-10-2336, 2011 WL 5244421, at *1 &
n.1 (D. Md. Nov. 1, 2011); Troy v. Kehe Food Distribs., Inc., 276 F.R.D. 642, 651 (W.D.
Wash. 2011); Sliger v. Prospect Mortg., LLC, No. CIV. S-11-465 LKK/EFB, 2011 WL
3747947, at *2 n.25 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011); Eddings, 2011 WL 4526675, at *1;
'3
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distinctions have supported favorable Rule 23(a) (2) rulings in suits
involving breach of form contracts, 3 4 deceptive trade or advertisin
practices,1 5 insurance coverage, securities and antitrust class actions,
Fair Housing Act litigation, and
and in prisoner civil-rights cases,
other constitutional litigation.o4 0 And in yet other cases, courts have
Creely v. HCR ManorCare, Inc., Nos. 3:09 CV 2879, 3:10 CV 417, 3:10 CV 2200, 2011
WL 3794142, at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio July 1, 2011). But see MacGregor v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., Civil No. 2:10-CV-03088, 2011 WL 2981466, at *4 (D.S.C. July 22, 2011) (stating
that while not controlling, the Wal-Mart Court's reasoning is "nonetheless
illuminating").
14 See, e.g., In re Med. Capital Sec. Litig., No. SAML 10-2145 DOC (RNBx), 2011
WL 5067208, at *2-3 & n.1 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2011); Altier v. Worley Catastrophe
Response, LLC, Civil Action Nos. 11-241, 11-242, 2011 WL 3205229, at *8 (E.D. La.
July 26, 2011) (noting that the class definition precludes from membership anyone
who did not sign a substantially identical agreement, and that defendants stipulated
in a parallel state-court action that all putative class members signed the same
contract). But compare Windisch v. Hometown Health Plan, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00664RCJ-WGC, 2011 WL 4758715 (D. Nev. Oct. 7, 2011), a suit challenging whether
defendant's reimbursement of claims made was contrary to the standardized
agreement involved, in which the court found that the claims relying on defendant's
use of a standardized software program to bundle and downcode reimbursement
claims could meet the Rule 23(a) (2) standard as, unlike Wal-Mart, they did not
involve "many separate bad acts by multiple actors connected only by the legal theory
of relief, but rather a unified bad act-the decision to use the allegedly improper
claims processing logic-by the same actor resulting in similar harm to many
persons." Id. at *5. But the claims that defendants "routinely and unjustifiably" failed
to make payments to the class within the time periods prescribed by the agreements
or to provide sufficient explanations for denials and reductions, like Wal-Mart, could
not meet the standard because they alleged a pattern of similar bad acts with no
common decision or decisionmaker. Id.
.. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 519, 521-22 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(finding a common advertising campaign and rejecting defendant's argument that
because reliance and causation are individual issues, certification was improper,
stating: "The Supreme Court reversed class certification in Wal-Mart because there
was no common policy or practice, not because there were factual and legal issues
that could not be determined on a classwide basis. Neither Rule 23 nor Wal-Mart
requires the degree of uniformity that Defendants appear to assert is necessary for
certification."); Gray v. Hearst Commc'ns, Inc., 444 F. App'x 698, 701-02 (4th Cir.
2011) (where defendant conceded it had a uniform distribution policy and that the
policy applied to all plaintiffs, the key question was whether defendant fulfilled its
distribution obligation).
136 See, e.g., Nobles v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:10-CV-04175-NKL,
2011 WL 3794021, at *4--5 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 2011); Churchill v. Cigna Corp., Civil
Action No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2011).
11
See, e.g., Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 277 F.R.D. 97, 106
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (securities); In re Aftermarket Auto. Lighting Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
276 F.R.D. 364, 369 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
138 See, e.g., Logory v. Cnty. of Susquehanna, 277 F.R.D. 135, 143 (M.D. Pa. 2011)
(challenge to policy of automatically delousing individuals being strip searched).
'39 See, e.g., Fair Hous. of the Dakotas, Inc. v. Goldmark Prop. Mgmt., Inc., Civil
No. 3:09-cv-58, 2011 WL 4381912, at *4 (D.N.D. Sept. 20, 2011).
1" See, e.g., Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 278 F.R.D. 30, 33 (D. Mass. 2011)
("[The Wal-Mart] rationale does not apply here where the alleged constitutional
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distinguished Wal-Mart on the ground that the statistical or other proof
provided by the plaintiffs was sufficient to identify a common course of
conduct. 141
Of course, the failure to establish that defendants acted in
accordance with a common policy or procedure, or that the legal
questions posed can be answered uniformly on a classwide basis, has led
to rulin s that Rule 23(a) (2) is not satisfied and certification must be
denied.
Moreover, in non-employment discrimination actions where
there is no common written policy or procedure governing defendant's
conduct and plaintiff is seeking to rely on statistical evidence to show
that, although challenged decisions are being made by multiple actors,
those decisions are having a uniform disparate impact on the class
members, several courts, applying Wal-Mart, have ruled that, under the
rigorous analysis now required under Rule 23(a) (2), statistical evidence
of average disparities cannot suffice to meet the commonality
requirement and certification must be denied. 4 3

violations flow from structural infirmities within a unified child welfare system and
where there is no requisite showing of common intent.").
14 See, e.g., DL v. Dist. of Columbia, 277 F.R.D. 38, 46 (D.D.C. 2011) (In a case
challenging whether all children with disabilities were getting a Free Adequate Public
Education (FAPE) in the District, the court distinguished Wal-Mart, saying "plaintiffs
have presented significant proof or 'glue' binding together the various reasons why
individual class members were denied a FAPE-namely, 'systemic failures' within
defendants' education system. Plaintiffs presented credible evidence of defendants'
ineffective policies and practices, which persisted for years without leading to any
significant increase in the number of preschool-age children received a FAPE.");
Williams-Green v. J. Alexander's Rests., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 374, 383 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (In
an action challenging company's distribution of tip pool proceeds as violating
company policy to return all proceeds to the employees, in which plaintiffs evidence
of the company financial summaries showing collections of tip shares greater than
those distributed and managers' statements about the company retaining a portion of
the tip pool demonstrate that claims arise from a common nucleus of fact based upon
standardized conduct); Morrow v. Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172, 192-93 (E.D. Tex.
2011) (In an action challenging citywide interdiction program as targeting racial and
ethnic minorities, the statistical evidence "clearly shows that the proportion of
minorities stopped in [the city] increased dramatically once the interdiction program
was instituted. The increase in the number of minorities stopped under the
interdiction program was so remarkable that it is statistically impossible that it was the
result of anything other than a decision to target racial and ethnic minorities.").
12 See, e.g., White v. W. Beef Props., Inc., No. 07 CV 2345(RJD) (JMA), 2011 WL
6140512, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2011) (overtime dispute spanning nine different
departments with qualitative differences in their specialization, size, and levels of
responsibility); Red v. Kraft Foods, No. CV 10-1028-GW(AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833,
at *9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (consumer suit about alleged misleading food labels
on six different products with different labeling claims); Haynes v. Planet Automall,
Inc., 276 F.R.D. 65, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (action under the Truth in Lending Act and
the New York General Business Law).
14 See, e.g., In re Countrywide Fin. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., No. 08-MD1974, 2011 WL 4862174, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2011); Rodriguez v. Nat'l City Bank,
277 F.R.D. 148, 155 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
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A look at one circuit case that has grappled with the Supreme
Court's treatment of the expert evidence and when and how an inquiry
into the merits is needed to inform the Rule 23(a) (2) determination
provides further insights. The case, Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 144came
out of the Ninth Circuit. The plaintiff class alleged gender discrimination
in a national discount retailer's promotion and management practices.
Because the district court had ruled prior to the Supreme Court's
announcement of its new commonality standard, the Ninth Circuit
remanded the action to allow the district court to conduct the new
rigorous analysis and determine whether Rule 23(a) (2) was satisfied. 4 5 In
doing so, the court took the opportunity to set out what the correct
standard now should be.
It announced the following guidelines. First, although a court need
not always consider the merits in making its Rule 23(a) determinations, it
must consider the merits if the merits overlap with the Rule 23(a)
requirements. 4 6 In Ellis itself, both parties in the case had presented
expert testimony and the defendant challenged class certification on,
among other things, commonality grounds and also moved to strike
plaintiffs expert evidence.147 As explained by the Ninth Circuit, the lower
court correctly applied the evidentiary standard in Daubert to evaluate
whether the expert's testimony was reliable in response to the
defendant's motion to strike. However, the court noted that the district
court erred insofar as it limited its analysis under Rule 23(a) (2) to the
1481
question whether the expert's testimony was admissible. In addition to
answering that question, the district court "was required to resolve any
factual disputes" between the parties' experts that were "necessary to
determine whether there was a common pattern and practice that could
affect the class as a whole."l 49 However, it did not need to engage in an indepth analysis of the merits or make any determination as to which party
was likely to prevail. 15As the Ninth Circuit concluded, "If there is no
evidence that the entire class was subject to the same allegedly
discriminatory practice, there is no question common to the class. In
657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011).
1'
Id. at 974, 980-84.
46 Id. at 981. Other courts also have recognized that the rigorous analysis demanded
by the Supreme Court will not always require the courts to go beyond the pleadings
and delve into the merits, but they need only do so when the proof of commonality
overlaps with the merits' contention, such as when it is alleged that defendant engages in
a pattern or practice of discrimination. See, e.g., Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 278
ER.D. 30, 33-34 (D. Mass. 2011).
147 Ellis, 657 F.3d at 977-78.
Id. at 982.
49 Id. at 983. The court noted that while resolving those factual disputes was
appropriate, "the district court was not required to resolve factual disputes regarding:
(1) whether women were in fact discriminated against in relevant managerial
positions at Costco, or (2) whether Costco does in fact have a culture of gender
stereotyping and paternalism." Id.
'so
Id. at 983 n.8.
14'
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other words, the district court must determine whether there was
'significant proof that [Costco] operated under a general policy of
discrimination.
The key is whether that proof can be presented on a
classwide basis because, if so, then Rule 23(a) (2) may be satisfied.
Taken together with the Third Circuit's expert-evidence decision for
purposes of decidin whether a medical monitoring claim could be tried
on a common basis, these two Circuit cases underscore that for expert
evidence to be sufficient to show that an ultimate trial can be
accomplished based on common evidence, the court must take into
account the individual class members' potential circumstances and,
having done so, the evidence then must allow or support a finding of a
common course of conduct or an injury that can be proved on a
common basis.
Finally, turning to the fourth question I raised about the impact of
Wal-Mart-whether the application of the new Rule 23(a) (2) standard to
suits brought under Rules 23(b) (1) or 23(b) (2) will be a significant
barrier to certifying those actions-in the six months since the decision
was announced there do not appear to be any published lower court
opinions confronting this question. Thus, it remains a question merely to
speculate about. However, there may be reason to believe that Wal-Mart
will have little impact. That is because of the nature of the cases that
appropriately may be certified under either of those two subdivisions. As
just described, lower courts have distinguished the circumstances in WalMart from other monetary relief or hybrid cases before them on the basis
that the classes there were found to be smaller or more cohesive in their
membership, or the claims were centered on a clear policy that was
applicable to all the members and thus capable of common resolution as
to its validity or legality. Those same factors are likely to be present in
most cases under the first two subdivisions in Rule 23(b),' 4 at least if we
limit Rule 23(b) (2) to actions in which solely injunctive or declaratory
relief is sought and in which any injunction that is issued will remedy the
claims of all the class.' 5 ' Thus, it is highly likely that the unity of the class

Id. at 983 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011)
(alteration in original)).
112 See In re Aftermarket Auto. Lighting Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 276 F.R.D. 364,
368-69 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
'5 See the discussion at notes 119-23 supra.
See generally 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 4, at § 1771-75.
Indeed, this distinction was recognized by Justice Scalia in his opinion in WalMart when he said: "Classes certified under (b) (1) and (b) (2) share the most
traditional justifications for class treatment-that individual adjudications would be
impossible or unworkable, as in a (b) (1) class, or that the relief sought must perforce
affect the entire class at once, as in a (b) (2) class." Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (footnote
omitted). This distinction was critical in a Third Circuit decision denying Rule 23(b) (2)
class certification in a toxic tort case seeking medical monitoring when the court,
citing Wal-Mart, noted that to allow certification the class members must have a
strong commonality of interests and that "[b]ecause causation and medical necessity
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members in those two types of actions will support a finding that the
claims presented rest upon a common contention that is capable of
classwide resolution so that, as required by the majority in Wal-Mart, the
"determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to
the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke."
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In conclusion, let me make two observations. First, the cluster of
class-action cases decided by the Supreme Court in the last two years is
particularly significant in large measure because it covers many different
and important issues central to this form of dispute resolution, rather
than because the Court embarked on new, uncharted paths. Second,
although the availability of class arbitration has been severely restricted, if
not effectively eliminated for state consumer claims, the Court has not
sounded the death knell for the future of class litigation. To be sure, in
many instances heightened pleading and proof standards may increase
the burdens and risks of class litigation. However, that alone, while
distressing to class proponents and heartening to opponents, does not
eliminate the continued viability of Rule 23 to offer a procedural remedy
for resolving aggregate disputes. This is seen, even at this early stage, by
the careful way in which the lower courts are moving forward and
continuing to certify class actions under the Court's newly-articulated
standards.

often require individual proof, medical monitoring classes may founder for lack of
cohesion." Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2011).
'56 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.

